Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s last-minute decision to add France to his Europe tour in early June is an indication of Delhi’s interest in engaging European powers in the Indian Ocean.
Simmering tensions between Beijing and Hanoi erupted recently due to disagreements over oil and gas exploration.
China and ASEAN inked the DOC in 2002, finalized guidelines for its implementation in 2011, and spent much of the last year negotiating a mysterious “framework” agreement. How much more “preparatory work” is needed before Beijing deems it the “proper time” for “substantive consultations” on a COC?
The latest iteration of the Shangri-La dialogue in Singapore (June 2-4), which brought together 23 defense ministers and hundreds of defense experts from all over the world, was dominated by three major strategic concerns.
In late 2011, Tokyo governor Shintaro Ishihara launched negotiations with the private Japanese owner of three of the disputed Senkaku Islands (administered by Japan but claimed by China and Taiwan). A government ministry had been leasing three islets—Uotsuri, Kita, and Minami—from owner Kunioki Kurihara for years to prevent hardliners from developing them or otherwise inflaming the dispute. Yet, hobbled by large business debts, Kurihara had recently decided to sell.
China’s East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone, a flashpoint since 2012, led to a palpable hardening of views in Washington on Chinese intentions. At the same time, despite some risky incidents, the Chinese military still conducts most of its air intercepts professionally and safely.
This post summarizes one of nine case studies included in CSIS’s new report, Countering Coercion in Maritime Asia: The Theory and Practice of Gray Zone Deterrence. The full case study is also available for download here. (Principal case study researcher: Jake Douglas) On May 1, 2014, Vietnam detected the Haiyang Shiyou 981 (HYSY 981) oil […]
In May 2013, China increased its presence near a Philippine outpost in the South China Sea. Chinese coast guard and other vessels were spotted only a few miles from Second Thomas Shoal. Since 1999, Philippine marines have occupied a dilapidated warship—the BRP Sierra Madre—atop this coral atoll in the disputed Spratly Islands. Manila’s foreign affairs department protested the onset of continuous Chinese patrols, calling them “provocative and illegal.” Other leaders acknowledged that Beijing could not be lawfully denied freedom of navigation around the reef, but still feared for the safety of Manila’s supply lines to its dilapidated garrison.
The results of the 30th ASEAN Summit, held in Manila on April 29, were somewhat disappointing—though not surprising.
Scarborough Shoal is widely seen as the most palpable erosion of stability in the South China Sea since 2012. Three conclusions about the standoff, especially its initial stages, highlight opportunities to better manage disputes in the years ahead.