If the Quad’s time has finally come, what purpose would cooperation among these four countries serve in the contemporary strategic environment?
While the salience of conflict for the sake of gaining territory may be declining, the importance of status as a potential driver of conflict—especially in Asia—may be increasing.
if the United States seriously wants to stop Chinese expansion in the South China Sea, it will have to engage in some costly tit-for-tat actions.
Under Duterte’s watch, ASEAN has lost a crucial opportunity to hold China to account. More worryingly, it has undermined the regional body’s centrality in addressing one of the most vexing and potentially explosive flashpoints in the 21st century.
CSIS experts Zack Cooper and Bonnie Glaser join AMTI director Gregory Poling to discuss the South China Sea at the start of 2018, including whether the Trump administration has an effective strategy on the issue, what China hopes to achieve in the disputed waters, and recommendations for the year ahead.
In light of the upward trajectory of the relationship between Manila and Tokyo, one might ask what a strategic partnership is, and what diplomatic advantages it confers. How does the Philippines-Japan strategic partnership figure in Duterte’s quest for an independent foreign policy? And how does the strategic partnership meet the shared interests of Manila and Tokyo?
In Yokota, Japan, President Trump spoke of seeking “peace and stability for the nations of the world,” including “a free and open Indo-Pacific region,” and lauded America’s ally Japan. Yet in his celebration of full-spectrum US military might, power upstaged purpose.
The Chinese military on August 1 formally opened its first overseas military base in Doraleh, Djibouti. According to the Chinese government, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) base in Djibouti will be used to support peacekeeping and humanitarian missions in Africa and the Middle East. However, there are strong indications that the base will also be […]
In this podcast, Professor Andrew Erickson discusses the origin and role of China’s maritime militia with host Bonnie Glaser, senior adviser for Asia and director of the China Power Project at CSIS.
Although the military enjoys a privileged position in Vietnam’s political system, force modernization has not been a priority in government spending for most of the last three decades.
Despite the complexities of the regional security environment and the sensitivities of the relationship between two former adversaries, it is fair to say that the current state of military partnership between the United States and Vietnam is at its highest point since diplomatic normalization in 1995. This strategic military rapprochement, however, has gone largely unnoticed by the Vietnamese public, as they worry more about a United States less engaged in the Asia Pacific under the Donald Trump administration.
Philippine strategic culture has combined a reliance on the United States for external defense and a focus on internal threats, especially the Muslim and Communist insurgents on the southern island of Mindanao. This has resulted in a chronic neglect of the navy, air force, and coast guard.
The ascent of Philippine president Rodrigo Duterte has come as a major political shock to Vietnam and its position in the South China Sea disputes.
Aware that their navy and air force are underequipped, Malaysia’s military planners have developed several plans to upgrade old platforms and acquire new ones in recent years. However, military spending has never been prioritized in the government budget, and most plans for force modernization have been repeatedly delayed or cancelled.
Since the South China Sea reemerged around 2008 as a hotspot of simmering conflict, conventional wisdom has held that tension in the area is driving an arms race among its littoral countries. A closer look at the facts and trends suggests otherwise.
With threats to sever or downgrade security relations with the United States alongside a courting of non-traditional security partners China and Russia, how will the Philippines’ security relations with established partners proceed under President Rodrigo Duterte?
Three newly-discovered official Chinese documents from 2009 and interviews conducted on Ly Son island in 2016 confirm accounts that Chinese uniformed personnel, on Chinese government ships, repeatedly kidnapped Vietnamese fishermen for ransom near the disputed Paracel Islands from 2005 to 2012.
The international legal obligation to cooperate on fisheries management and the environment is matched by practical necessity. Communities all around the South China Sea are highly dependent on fish stocks for both food security and local livelihoods. Yet the region has seen catch rates plummet in recent years thanks to a combination of overfishing and willful environmental destruction.
AMTI director Gregory Poling speaks with CSIS experts Sarah Watson and Zack Cooper about the months-long standoff between India and China over the Doklam plateau. The conversation covers the origins of the conflict, the resolution of the current crisis, and how the lessons learned can be applied by other states facing Chinese coercion.
As the 2017 chairman of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, Duterte has soft-pedaled on the South China Sea disputes in an effort to please China. The upshot is the regional body’s fast slide into irrelevance in shaping the regional security architecture.
Since October 2015, the United States has conducted seven freedom of navigation operations that seek to challenge specific Chinese claims in the South China Sea. Eleanor Freund of the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs recently published a report on the FONOPs program that details exactly how the U.S. Navy challenged five of those seven claims, as well as explaining the purpose and utility of the program in the South China Sea.
In this podcast we discuss altering the U.S. policy approach to the South China Sea. Where does the South China Sea rank in the pecking order of U.S. policy interests? How much risk should America be willing to take over these disputed waters?
The Seventh Annual CSIS South China Sea Conference on July 18 brought together security, legal, and environmental experts to review events of the past year. The participants had a lot of ground to cover: the impact of the arbitral tribunal’s award in Manila’s case against Beijing, the near-completion of China’s artificial island bases in the Spratly Islands, and the […]
This episode of the CSIS CogitAsia podcast discusses maritime coercion in the Asia Pacific. Chinese actions in maritime Asia have led to a great deal of concern and commentary since disputes in the East and South China Seas have come to the forefront in recent years. CSIS’s Asia Program and International Security Program recently published a […]
AMTI director Gregory Poling speaks with Chatham House's Bill Hayton about the withdrawal of the Repsol gas-drilling expedition from Vietnam’s block 136-03, Beijing’s strong-arm tactics against Hanoi, and implications for the long-simmering Sino-Vietnamese conflict over energy deposits in the South China Sea.
Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s last-minute decision to add France to his Europe tour in early June is an indication of Delhi’s interest in engaging European powers in the Indian Ocean.
Simmering tensions between Beijing and Hanoi erupted recently due to disagreements over oil and gas exploration.
China and ASEAN inked the DOC in 2002, finalized guidelines for its implementation in 2011, and spent much of the last year negotiating a mysterious “framework” agreement. How much more “preparatory work” is needed before Beijing deems it the “proper time” for “substantive consultations” on a COC?
The latest iteration of the Shangri-La dialogue in Singapore (June 2-4), which brought together 23 defense ministers and hundreds of defense experts from all over the world, was dominated by three major strategic concerns.
In late 2011, Tokyo governor Shintaro Ishihara launched negotiations with the private Japanese owner of three of the disputed Senkaku Islands (administered by Japan but claimed by China and Taiwan). A government ministry had been leasing three islets—Uotsuri, Kita, and Minami—from owner Kunioki Kurihara for years to prevent hardliners from developing them or otherwise inflaming the dispute. Yet, hobbled by large business debts, Kurihara had recently decided to sell.