Europe and the Indo-Pacific may be connected by global data flows, but their submarine cable policies reflect vastly different priorities. In Europe, concerns over hostile state interference—particularly from Russia—have put resilience, redundancy, and rapid response at the center of policy frameworks. In contrast, Indo-Pacific governments are preoccupied with regional autonomy and digital sovereignty, responding to China’s push for market share in critical communications infrastructure with counter-initiatives. The divergence marks a broader geopolitical fault line in how states conceptualize digital risk under the sea.
These divergent approaches to submarine cable security are worthy of consideration—a focus on resilience in Europe and a focus on connectivity security in the Indo-Pacific. How do these approaches differ and can a holistic strategy which marries resilience and connectivity security be adopted by Indo-Pacific states?
The security of subsea cables has become a top priority in Europe, especially after a spate of suspected incidents targeting critical infrastructure. In response, NATO and the European Union, along with individual European states, have ramped up efforts to enhance cable resilience. In early 2024, NATO launched the Baltic Sentry Mission, a comprehensive strategy designed to protect subsea cables from sabotage. This mission emphasizes “surveillance and deterrence,” deploying naval assets such as frigates, drones, and maritime patrol aircraft. Even more recently, the European Commission announced that it would direct over $1.1 million to further bolster undersea cable security through advanced surveillance and the creation of a dedicated repair fleet. Even traditionally neutral countries like Ireland have initiated discussions on fortifying subsea cable systems in light of the growing security risks.
This resilience-based approach is rooted in geopolitical concerns surrounding Russia’s potential to disrupt vital subsea communications and energy infrastructure. As tensions in the continent continue to soar, the European focus is on safeguarding cables from intentional damage, with strategies that extend to surveillance, deterrence, and a rapid military interdiction if necessary.
Governments in the Indo-Pacific, however, are largely concerned about a different set of challenges when it comes to subsea cables. While cable resilience is still furthered via various policies, the primary focus in the region is on connectivity security—strategic competition for control over critical communication routes. Unlike Europe, where concerns over sabotage dominate, many in the Indo-Pacific (especially Quad nations) are preoccupied by China’s ambitions to dominate the submarine cable market.
China’s significant ambitions in undersea cables—coupled with its growing global power – have raised the alarm across the Indo-Pacific. As China seeks to expand its geopolitical footprint, its firms that lay and install cable networks could give Beijing substantial leverage over regional information flows, raising concerns about data integrity and espionage. In contrast, Russia does not play a significant role in the subsea cable market.
While stymieing China’s cable ambitions is important, Quad members must also account for the growing risks of seabed warfare—a concept unfortunately familiar in Europe. In recent years in the Indo-Pacific, there has been an increasing number of incidents cable damage, including one incident in the Taiwan Strait earlier this year, which resulted in Taiwan’s coast guard seizing a Chinese-linked vessel suspected of severing a critical cable. Such incidents highlight the escalating risks of cable sabotage in the region.
Drawing from European experiences, resilience (in addition to connectivity security) should be integrated into the national security, defense, and maritime security strategies of Quad nations. Europe’s responses to the risks posed by adversaries like Russia should serve as a cautionary tale for the Indo-Pacific. By combining both elements – resilience to protect cables from physical damage and strategic control over connectivity to safeguard data integrity – key Indo-Pacific players can, more comprehensively and robustly, defend critical seabed lines of communication.
This article was written as part of a multi-year project being undertaken on Defending Seabed Critical Infrastructure by the Australia India Institute, University of Melbourne, with the support of the Australian Department of Defence.
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