Does Indonesia have a maritime strategy?
There are two ways to approach this question:
First, Jakarta does not have universally agreed national guidelines on maritime strategy. However, it consistently refers to three historical reference points: the Struggle for Independence (1945–49), the Djuanda Declaration (1957), and the Palapa Oath (14th century). These emphasize the far-flung archipelago of over 18,000 islands as one unified maritime space, thus shaping national-level sea power, law enforcement, and border diplomacy. This foundational logic provides coherence to Indonesia’s maritime actions despite the absence of a single codified strategy.
Second, Jakarta’s maritime strategy evolves across multiple security agencies. The Indonesian military employs a layered-defense strategy, with sea power tethered to support its territorial focus. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs leverages border diplomacy, using the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) to secure archipelagic rights. Meanwhile, domestic agencies like the Indonesian Maritime Security Agency (Bakamla) coordinate a multi-agency law enforcement approach. These strategies have adapted to shifts in the international maritime regime. Previously, maritime zones were limited to territorial waters and the high seas. The 1982 UNCLOS expanded this framework, formally recognizing internal waters, the territorial sea, the contiguous zone, the exclusive economic zone (EEZ), and the continental shelf. Indonesia’s evolving maritime strategies reflect these broader international developments.
Combined, these two approaches suggest that Indonesia’s maritime strategy is a dynamic, multi-layered construct shaped by historical continuity, executed through diverse agencies, and constantly adapting to shifting domestic and international contexts. It functions both as a spectrum—adjusting to geopolitical and financial constraints—and as a process—where actors continuously contest priorities and implementation. Understanding Indonesia’s maritime strategy as both a spectrum and a process challenges the idea that the absence of a singular national document means a lack of strategy.
Indonesia’s Maritime Strategy as a Spectrum
Indonesia’s maritime strategy operates on a layered spectrum, with specific agencies prioritizing efforts from securing the major islands to protecting the waters between them and the surrounding maritime region.
The core layer, securing Indonesia’s territorial integrity (kesatuan), is a top priority—both against internal rebellion and external threats. Maritime space is often viewed as a vulnerable frontier, particularly through strategic chokepoints. This perspective is primarily upheld by defense institutions, especially the Indonesian military (TNI), whose concerns are shaped by historical experiences, notably guerrilla warfare tactics during the Struggle for Independence (1945–49). It informs policies like Prabowo Subianto’s Defense of Major Islands (Pertahanan Pulau-Pulau Besar), which revives the idea of self-sufficient islands during an invasion. This land-centric focus explains the Indonesian Army’s continued dominance over the Navy, despite Jakarta’s growing focus on building sea power.
The second layer, securing the waters between the islands, aims to reinforce Indonesia’s status as an archipelagic state (kepulauan), as formalised in the 1957 Djuanda Declaration. As one of only six nations granted archipelagic recognition under UNCLOS, Indonesia controls the waters linking its islands. Multiple agencies oversee this space: law enforcement (Ministry of Transport, Customs, Police, Navy, and Bakamla), resource management (Ministry of Marine Affairs and Fisheries), and border diplomacy (Ministry of Foreign Affairs). While inter-agency contestation over authority is common, all actors share concerns about Indonesia’s archipelagic vulnerabilities and are strategizing on maximizing the country’s interests across various bodies of water. For example, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs plays a crucial role in shaping interpretations of UNCLOS by setting legal precedents in maritime border negotiations that advance Indonesia’s interests. The conclusion of its EEZ negotiation with Vietnam in 2023 further reinforces Jakarta’s dual-boundary argument, challenging Malaysia’s preference for a single maritime boundary with Indonesia.
The third layer is Indonesia’s most ambitious but least developed regional strategy, which involves stabilising the surrounding maritime region. Rooted in the 14th-century Palapa Oath, this logic frames Southeast Asia’s security (historically referred to as Nusantara, which controversially includes the greater Malay Archipelago) as a buffer against external threats to Java. Suharto’s regional resilience doctrine similarly linked maritime security to economic growth. Today, Indonesia leads ASEAN’s Code of Conduct negotiations with China and confidence-building efforts in the region.
The layered spectrum reflects the outward direction of Indonesia’s maritime priorities, where securing the major islands remains the most developed, securing inter-island waters is the most contested, and securing the nearby maritime region is the most aspirational.
While Indonesia aims to stabilize the maritime region to bolster its internal security—evident in efforts to establish regional rules of engagement in times of armed conflict—practical constraints like economic development and domestic stability often refocus its priorities on securing internal waters, developing its green-water navy, and protecting major islands.
Indonesia’s Maritime Strategy as a Process
Indonesia’s maritime thinking has evolved through engagement with international legal regimes rather than purely local traditions. As a result, “maritime” remains an externally influenced, contested concept, often conflated with “archipelagic.” While the former refers to sea-based activities, the latter emphasizes island interconnectedness and national rights under international law. Indonesia’s constitution (Article 25A) defines the country as an archipelagic state, prompting debates over whether it should prioritize its seas or islands, and whether it aspires to maritime power status or remains content with its archipelagic identity.
To address these questions, Indonesia’s maritime agencies engage in debates over the maritime domain’s definition, jurisdiction, and authority. This contestation unfolds across three overlapping debates: land vs. sea, marine (naval) vs. shipping (commercial), and economy vs. security. This ongoing contestation makes Indonesia’s maritime strategy a dynamic, evolving process.
Land vs. Sea
Indonesia’s guerrilla warfare tradition create tension between land and sea priorities. This duality manifests in conflicting goals: Indonesia seeks to be a strategic fulcrum—central to regional stability—while maintaining a post-colonial reluctance to allow foreign actors access to its waters. This duality persists in domestic debates over Singaporean military exercises in Indonesian waters and debates on deeper naval cooperation with Australia.
Marine vs. Shipping
Indonesia’s maritime governance is shaped by overlapping laws: the 2014 Marine Affairs Law (UU Kelautan) grants broad authority to Bakamla, while the 2008 Shipping Law (UU Pelayaran) empowers the Sea and Coast Guard (KPLP). Both agencies claim law enforcement jurisdiction, creating bureaucratic fragmentation and complicating strategic coherence. The ongoing legal review reflects a broader effort to align with regional trends in coast guard consolidation while addressing jurisdictional clarity, resource allocation, and power struggles within Indonesia’s maritime security apparatus.
Economy vs. Security
Indonesia’s recent maritime strategy took shape under former President Joko Widodo’s (Jokowi) Global Maritime Fulcrum, institutionalized through action plans (2016–2019, 2021–2025) that prioritized economic development over security. These plans focused on trade corridors rather than naval power, drawing criticism for their lack of concrete defense strategies. Under Prabowo Subianto’s presidency (2024–present), the dissolution of the Coordinating Ministry for Maritime Affairs and Investment signals a shift towards separating economic and security concerns, potentially elevating maritime security in Indonesia’s strategic priorities.
Indonesia’s maritime strategy remains a contested, evolving process—shaped by historical legacies, institutional rivalries, and shifting national priorities, as it balances economic aspirations with security imperatives in an increasingly complex maritime environment.
So what?
Indonesia’s case illustrates how emerging actors navigate maritime space, demonstrating that strategy does not require a fixed document but instead can take shape through consistent reference points. While the maritime concept was externally introduced and remains contested domestically, each agency maintains clear priorities and roles. These guide policy, strategic behaviour, and agency preferences, evolving alongside regional and international maritime order.
This article is part of a series of commentaries sharing findings from the project on Indonesia’s Evolving Maritime Strategy, jointly led by Emirza Adi Syailendra and Evelyn Goh at The Australian National University.
