The Philippines and the United States need to think about deterrence – as an Alliance – as President Donald Trump’s government lays out its future Indo-Pacific Strategy. The Philippines is likely to be in solidarity with how the second Trump administration will approach China. The Philippines also has room to be more proactive and bolder in its own engagement with China. This has already manifested in the domestic domain as Filipinos are starting to grasp the depth of malign foreign influence and interference operations, many of which point to covert operations by suspected Chinese operatives as well as Philippine offshore gaming operators run by Chinese and Southeast Asian nationals that have been the subject of government crackdown. Despite these contentious issues, the Philippines continues to engage with China diplomatically, evidenced by both sides’ use of the Bilateral Consultative Mechanism platform amid territorial incursions.
With the return of a second Trump administration to the helm, and the assurances made thus far by Secretary of State Marco Rubio, the Philippines is cognizant of the call to be more proactive. Indeed, the transactionalism of the Trump administration’s foreign policy, a major recurring theme in recent weeks, prompts an increase in the Philippines’ foreign policy tempo and necessitates leadership to answer the question on what it can bring to the table.
More concretely, the Philippines offers access and credibility.
First, the United States now has unprecedented access in the region, more than it did than the Bases Agreement years (1947-1991). There are more EDCA sites than former U.S. military bases. The United States will thus have mechanisms allowing it to access theaters in both Northeast and Southeast Asia thanks to the Philippines.
Second, the Philippines stands as a significant part of the first island chain that is on the frontlines of Chinese coercion. The significant access the United States has gained from the Philippines can be seen as equal to what the United States demands of European members of NATO. Once the bases are fully operational, the Philippines and the United States will be on almost equal terms with regard to alliance commitments and both sides stand to benefit from this.
The United States’ association with the Philippines affords it credibility, allowing Washington to build-up diplomatic capital across ASEAN and, in the long term, assures it position of being on “the right side of history”. Abiding, supporting, and at times supplementing the Philippines’ momentum means that the United States has significant influence in shaping regional perceptions about great power competition. Washington is vulnerable to China accusations of unilateralism in the region, and attempts to downplay such views are liable to only accelerate their adoption by ASEAN. Instead, the United States can dispel those concerns by taking action in concert with the Philippines, which builds U.S. credibility as an external partner and guarantor of regional stability and protects the rule of international law.
Deterrence should be the starting point of alliance activities in 2025, as preventing conflict with China should be on top of the minds of alliance managers. China will, as any rising power would, seek to supplant the United States as the primary power in the Indo-Pacific. The South China Sea is part of Beijing’s Southern Theater Command, and it has vast interests over the expanse. Having dictated the pace of events in the South China Sea for over a decade, China already possesses escalation dominance, and it is expected that it will seek to further erode the effectiveness of the U.S. military presence in the area. This in turn reduces the ability of the United States to respond to a Taiwan crisis in an efficient manner.
Since 2012, China has demonstrably sought to reduce the deployment of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) in the South China Sea. By normative means (e.g. so-called white hull to white hull diplomacy) or by forcing the Philippines to believe that the use of civilian vessels is less provocative, China has effectively stymied the capacity of the Philippine military to defend its maritime domain. Nevertheless, two actions of the AFP have pushed Beijing to negotiate with Manila and prompted a more forceful information campaign. First, the Second Thomas Shoal incident of June 17, 2024 is evidence that China seeks to avoid extensive engagement with the Philippine military, which contrasts strongly against their more belligerent posture against the civilian vessels of the Philippine Coast Guard and the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources. Second, the deployment of the Typhon missiles system in the Philippines has provoked Beijing to continue its verbal assault, the latest of which stated “China will not sit idly by when its security interests are harmed or threatened.”
To build deterrence against China, robust diplomatic, informational, military, and economic engagement between the United States and the Philippines will be necessary. The alliance’s deterrent effect is strongest when China believes that the allied countries are willing to collectively and cohesively respond to any escalatory activities. To orchestrate the range of activities across the alliance, in multiple domains, the United States and the Philippines need to establish new alliance management mechanisms to coordinate bilateral activities. Such mechanisms can also help foster shared concepts of deterrence to ensure the allies approach the problems in a similar way.
The allies should activate minilateral and multilateral diplomatic channels such as unified messaging on China’s dangerous behaviors, making Philippine responses to Beijing unpredictable, creating easier avenues for multilateral activities at sea, and returning the AFP to the frontlines of the South China Sea.
China needs to be convinced that the cost of infringing on Philippine sovereignty and sovereign rights will outweigh the benefits of such actions. That is the key to deterrence, and something that Manila and Washington should think about moving forward. The allied countries have both unilateral and combined interests and abilities to boost alliance readiness. The question is if Washington and Manila are prepared to accept the costs of ensuring strategic stability in the South China Sea, which may involve shedding some of the activities that have failed to deter Beijing.
Conclusion
Ultimately, the Philippines has great expectations and confidence in the Trump administration. The alliance is expected to strengthen further as both the Philippines and the United States enact their respective foreign policies, especially in the context of combatting and deterring Chinese aggression. Both are also expected to be more proactive in their approaches towards the alliance, for mutual benefit. The United States has everything to gain by addressing the concerns of the Philippines, further bolstering its position and fortifying its own national security.
