In early May this year, the Malaysian government considered replacing the Tun Sharifah Rodziah static offshore forward operating base with a Mobile Offshore Base (MOB). This shift in thinking is not merely a logistical upgrade but a timely and strategic recalibration of the country’s maritime security architecture. Defence Minister Datuk Seri Mohamed Khaled Nordin said the proposed concept involves a mobile forward operating base, which would sustain security operational capabilities in East Sabah. The MOB would serve as a maritime command hub, logistics node, and forward-operating platform capable of hosting helicopters, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and quick reaction forces.
Malaysia’s decision to focus on MOB can be understood in several ways. As a maritime nation, investing in MOB provides a significant strategic advantage because it has the agility and operational depth to monitor, interdict, and respond to threats in real time at sea. For starters, it offers forward-basing solutions in geographically remote waters that are lacking adequate deep-water ports, providing a critical staging area for sustained operations. In this capacity, this platform can enhance Malaysia’s ability to project both maritime law enforcement and humanitarian capabilities across the archipelagic and semi-enclosed sea areas, such as the one bordering the southern Philippines and northern Kalimantan. This can facilitate multi-agency operations, allowing not only the Royal Malaysian Navy (RMN) but also the Malaysian Maritime Enforcement Agency (MMEA) and other civilian maritime entities to co-deploy and operate from a common platform..
For Malaysia, investing in MOB could serve as one of the best deterrents and a force multiplier taking into consideration its complex water space especially in the East Sabah. The geographic configuration of East Sabah, particularly its proximity to the maritime boundary with the southern Philippines, renders it vulnerability to transnational maritime threats. Unlike Indonesia and the Philippines, which benefit from dense archipelagic geographical features that provide natural platforms for maritime surveillance, enforcement, and the positioning of security forces, Malaysia’s east coast of Sabah is comparatively limited in the number and distribution of islands. This geographic limitation constrains the ability of Malaysian security forces to establish permanent forward-operating posts or maintain a sustained maritime presence across its extensive territorial waters.
The few islands that do exist, such as Pulau Mataking or Pulau Sipadan, are primarily used for tourism, lacking both the infrastructure and strategic proximity to function as viable security staging points. In this context, the deployment of a MOB becomes operationally imperative. A MOB would serve as a mobile, forward-operating platform to support multi-agency coordination, enable persistent maritime surveillance and facilitate rapid response in areas where static shore-based assets are inadequate.
A relevant case underscoring this requirement is the 2016 abduction of four Malaysian crewmen from the tugboat MV Massive 6 by the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG). The kidnapping took place off the coast of Ligitan Island, and the perpetrators quickly retreated across the porous maritime boundary into the Sulu archipelago, utilizing high-speed boats and a network of uninhabited islands for evasion. This incident, one among several similar cross-border incursions, exemplifies how Malaysia’s limited offshore basing options and lack of nearby permanent posts inhibit timely interdiction and enforcement. By contrast, the ASG leveraged the geographic advantage of the Philippines’ scattered islands to execute and escape maritime kidnappings with impunity. In such an environment, a Malaysian MOB would have significantly enhanced the state’s capacity to monitor high-threat sea lanes, project force closer to the maritime boundary and reduce the response time in intercepting maritime crimes. Beyond operational effectiveness, it would also serve as a visible deterrent, reinforcing sovereignty and security in the East Sabah Security Zone (ESSZONE) while addressing the strategic gaps created by Sabah’s geographic constraints.
Another example is the 2013 Lahad Datu incursion, which saw armed militants from the southern Philippines were found undetected on Sabah’s shores, revealed glaring gaps in coastal monitoring, reaction time and forward defence posture. The incident underscored the strategic vulnerability of Sabah’s eastern coastline and highlighted the urgent need for mobile, persistent surveillance and rapid deployment capabilities. In this case, the deployment of an MOB in East Sabah would have enhanced surveillance, deterrence and rapid response capacity while demonstrating that national security investments are increasingly calibrated to regional needs.
Furthermore, with the establishment of MOB, Malaysia can complement existing naval bases in Sabah, such as KD Sri Semporna and KD Sri Sandakan, by filling critical operational gaps in sea coverage, mobility, and persistent presence in remote waters improving coverage of Sabah’s expansive and strategically sensitive maritime territory.
The concept of a MOB is not without precedent. The United States extensively studied and developed the concept in the 1990s and early 2000s to determine its technical and operational feasibility. Designed to function as floating, reconfigurable bases, the United States’ MOBs were envisioned to support logistics, air operations, and troop deployments in areas lacking conventional bases. These semisubmersible platforms were found to be capable of operating under high sea states and housing up to 3,000 troops, while offering up to 275,000 square meters of reconfigurable storage and 40,000 cubic meters of fuel capacity. Despite their high cost estimated at over $25 billion for a full 5,000-ft configuration they remain an instructive model for developing scaled, region-specific variants such as what Malaysia might consider.
The sharing of mobile maritime platform by both the navy and coast guard is also common in the United States. The Expeditionary Sea Bases (ESBs), i.e. the USS Lewis B. Puller (ESB-3), are shared between the U.S. Navy and U.S. Coast Guard for a range of missions including special operations, counter-piracy and humanitarian assistance. Adopting a similar inter-agency framework, Malaysia’s MOB could serve as a central enforcement node, supporting joint patrols, interdictions and law enforcement missions in contested or poorly governed waters. This would contribute to the establishment of a whole-of-government maritime security architecture, optimizing the utility of limited resources through enhanced interoperability and operational synergy.
Lessons from other international practices further support this direction. Japan has explored floating maritime platforms for dual-use purposes and China has deployed floating structures to reinforce its grey-zone activities in the South China Sea. While Malaysia’s version will not emulate the scale or strategic intent of these powers, it can draw upon the utility of mobile platforms for deterrence and maritime sovereignty enforcement in complex littoral environments. Importantly, this shift is not just about operational hardware, but also about adapting to the realities of hybrid threats and multi-domain challenges in the Indo-Pacific sphere of influence.
However, it is also important to recognize its limitations. Despite its relative resilience, a MOB is a high-value asset and could become a strategic target. Its maintenance costs, resupply needs, and long-term sustainability in tropical maritime conditions must be carefully considered. Unlike United States applications which focused on large-scale expeditionary warfare, Malaysia’s needs are more focused on tactical deterrence, border security, and maritime policing making leaner, modular platforms more appropriate.
A forward-leaning, mobile capability is essential to ensure that Malaysia remains resilient, responsive and ready in the face of rising maritime security threats. Moving forward, Malaysia should consider pilot-testing modular or converted oil rig platforms and integrating them with whole-of-government maritime security efforts. This would provide an affordable, adaptable and locally resonant solution to ensuring that the eastern frontier remains secure in the face of rising regional volatility. In essence, the idea of a MOB concept reflects a maturing understanding and a strategic leap of Malaysia’s geostrategic vulnerabilities and the imperative of developing adaptable, distributed capabilities. Moreover, this move demonstrates the operationalisation of the Defence White Paper’s emphasis on “two-theatre operations,” a policy vision that calls for independent yet interoperable capabilities across both maritime theatres.
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