Introduction
On September 10, China approved the establishment of a nature reserve at Scarborough Shoal, also known as Bajo de Masinloc in Tagalog or Huangyan Dao in Chinese, a coral atoll whose sovereignty is under dispute between China and the Philippines. According to Beijing, the reserve covers approximately one acre on the northeastern side of the shoal, and is comprised of two zones: a core area encompassing the fringing reef itself and an experimental area extending 390–800 yards into the surrounding waters. The legal basis cited for this initiative is the State Council’s 1994 Regulations on Nature Reserves, which provides for the establishment and management of protected areas to safeguard the natural environment and resources. Supporters of the plan interpret it as a demonstration of China’s willingness to shoulder environmental responsibilities and integrate ecological priorities into maritime governance.
The Philippines, however, has protested strongly against this plan, calling it a “pretext to eventual occupation” and urging Beijing to withdraw it immediately. The Department of Foreign Affairs in Manila announced that a diplomatic protest would be lodged against what it termed an unlawful and illegitimate act violating the Philippines’ sovereign rights under international law. Several parties, including Canada, Australia, Japan, Denmark, the United Kingdom, and the European Union, have voiced concern, arguing that China’s move risks undermining peace and stability in the South China Sea. Many experts have described it as a case of environmental lawfare: the instrumental use of environmental law to alter the status quo.
Furthermore, in the South China Sea arbitration, Scarborough Shoal was recognized by the arbitral tribunal to be traditional fishing grounds for fishermen in the region, including “from Philippines, China (including Taiwan), and Vietnam.” On the other hand, in the Chagos Marine Protected Area arbitration, the arbitral tribunal also stated that the establishment of an marine protected area in the territorial sea shall respect the rights of other States in this area, including traditional fishing rights. The Chagos case also shows that the unilateral establishment of marine protected area in disputed territory does not constitute a legal basis for claiming sovereignty.
This commentary proposes an alternative path. Instead of pursuing unilateral conservation measures, China and the Philippines could jointly establish a Scarborough Peace Park, a bilateral marine protected area designed to conserve the shoal’s biodiversity while simultaneously fostering peace and cooperation. Such parks for peace are a special category of transboundary protected areas intended not only to safeguard ecological and cultural values but also to promote trust and collaboration. The approach suggests adopting interim arrangements in disputed maritime waters as stipulated in article 74(3) of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) to a disputed territorial sea area where there exists a common traditional fishing right (i.e. territorial seas “with special circumstances” under article 15 of UNCLOS). This is equally a way to implement article 123 of UNCLOS, which calls for cooperation between States bordering an semi-enclosed sea to coordinate the management, conservation, exploration, and exploitation of the living resources of the sea as well as the protection and preservation of the marine environment. A similar approach has been previously suggested for the Spratly Islands and could be adapted for Scarborough Shoal. Consequently, the establishment of a Scarborough Peace Park could proceed in four progressive stages as explained below.
1. Setting the Stage
China’s unilateral declaration of a nature reserve at Scarborough has triggered widespread protests and heightened diplomatic tension. To mitigate these concerns and open avenues for cooperation, China could undertake several confidence-building steps. First, it might initially apply the reserve’s restrictions solely to Chinese vessels. This would signal that the initiative’s primary purpose is environmental protection rather than an assertion of sovereignty. Second, China should publish detailed scientific findings on the condition of the shoal’s ecosystem and its main environmental threats. Transparency would demonstrate that conservation measures are based on objective data, not political motives. For its part, the Philippines should review the Chinese data critically to determine whether these support the need for conservation. This could mark the first small but significant step toward collaborative environmental governance.
2. Collaborative Marine Scientific Research
Following this initial stage, the two countries could agree to conduct joint marine scientific research in the Scarborough Shoal area. Such research would allow them to build a shared understanding of the shoal’s ecological status while avoiding reliance on one-sided information. In accordance with Article 246 of UNCLOS, marine scientific research cannot serve as the legal basis for asserting maritime claims. Hence, cooperation on marine scientific research would not prejudice either side’s sovereignty position. Beyond scientific value, joint research could function as a practical confidence-building measure, promoting dialogue and reducing political tensions.
3. Joint Conservation Based on National Law
If the joint research findings justify the adoption of area-based conservation measures, the two parties could then negotiate the precise geographical scope and management framework of the Scarborough Peace Park. Any conservation arrangement should remain within a 12-nautical-mile radius of the shoal to avoid prejudicing official positions on its legal status. For the Philippines, this would safeguard the conclusions of the 2016 South China Sea arbitration, which classified Scarborough Shoal as a “rock” under Article 121(3) of UNCLOS, thus not entitled to generate its own exclusive economic zone and continental shelf beyond 12 nautical miles. For China, this limitation would not conflict with its designation of the area as a nature reserve in force as the current measure also does not go beyond 12 nautical miles of the shoal.
Within this agreed zone, each party could implement conservation measures consistent with its domestic legislation: China under the 1994 Regulations on Nature Reserves and the Philippines under Republic Act No. 11038 (Expanded National Integrated Protected Areas System Act, 2018). As these frameworks provide equivalent protection standards, both sides could ensure a coherent and effective regime for the peace park. While adopting conservation measures relating to the Scarborough Peace Park, China and Philippines should also take into consideration traditional fishing by fishers from other States in this area.
4. Coordinated Flag State Enforcement
Effective law enforcement is crucial for the effectiveness of the peace park. To that end, China and the Philippines could adopt a flag state enforcement mechanism, whereby each state exercises enforcement jurisdiction only over vessels flying its own flag. This approach would avoid direct confrontations while maintaining legal order. If either side detects a violation by a vessel of the other party, it should promptly notify the latter’s relevant authorities for appropriate investigation and sanction. Both parties could also take joint action against vessels flying the flags of third states engaged in harmful activities within the park to close potential governance gaps and ensure that conservation measures achieve their intended purpose.
Conclusion
Scarborough Shoal is an ecologically significant area that has long served as a traditional fishing ground for communities across the South China Sea. Its protection is both an environmental necessity and a political challenge. Conservation efforts must be designed carefully to avoid escalating disputes or creating new sources of mistrust. The proposed Scarborough Peace Park offers a viable and constructive alternative: it would safeguard biodiversity, prevent further ecological degradation, and at the same time serve as a powerful confidence-building measure between China and the Philippines. Ultimately, such an initiative could transform a site of tension into a symbol of cooperation, and thus laying the foundation for peace and sustainability in the South China Sea.
The authors would like to thank Professor Lan Anh T. Nguyen for her comments and suggestions.
