This article is written in response to Navigating the Divide: Why the U.S. Navy Must Resume FONOPs in Indonesia by Patrick Panjeti, Military Fellow at the CSIS Defence and Security Department.
1. Introduction: Misrepresenting Indonesia’s Legal Commitments
In his essay “Navigating the Divide,” Patrick Panjeti presents a provocative and fictional scenario set in 2027: a U.S. Navy carrier strike group, en route from Perth to the South China Sea during a crisis in the Taiwan Strait, is abruptly forced to reroute after Indonesia announces the closure of its archipelagic waters and airspace to all foreign military vessels and aircraft. This detour, Panjeti argues, imposes costly delays and jeopardizes U.S. strategic agility—casting Indonesia’s decision as not only inconvenient but dangerously irresponsible.
While this narrative may succeed in dramatizing operational constraints, it ultimately oversimplifies—and misrepresents—Indonesia’s legal position under international law. By implying that Indonesia’s actions would violate the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and undermine the “freedom of navigation” regime, Panjeti disregards the carefully balanced legal framework governing archipelagic states. His critique risks mischaracterizing Indonesia’s consistent adherence to both the letter and spirit of UNCLOS and relevant international humanitarian law, particularly the San Remo Manual.
This article offers a critical legal rebuttal to Panjeti’s claims. It argues that the scenario he presents—wherein Indonesia enforces neutrality and regulates military access through its waters—does not reflect legal obstructionism but rather a legitimate and codified exercise of sovereign rights. Indonesia’s conduct, even as hypothetically described, is consistent with its international obligations and represents a lawful balancing of navigational freedoms with the duties of a neutral and responsible maritime state.
2. The Strategic Fiction of a Total Maritime Closure
Panjeti’s scenario constructs a version of reality that is more fiction than plausible. The idea that Indonesia would close all archipelagic waters and airspace to foreign military access, including lawful transit through designated sea lanes, mischaracterizes the legal structure of UNCLOS, particularly Articles 53 and 54.
Even in a scenario where Indonesia asserts its neutrality in a conflict (such as a Taiwan Strait crisis), it cannot suspend the right of transit passage through Archipelagic Sea Lanes (ASLs) under UNCLOS Article 38(3). Transit passage and (archipelagic sea lanes passage) is non-suspendable (both during peacetime and armed conflict), except under extreme circumstances and only when re-routing sea lanes for safety or security reasons. Even then, redesignation must be approved by the International Maritime Organization (IMO), not unilaterally declared by the coastal state, as provided in UNCLOS Article 53(9).
Thus, Panjeti’s claim that Indonesia could (or would) close its ASLs without legal repercussions is unfounded. It misinterprets the balance of rights and duties under UNCLOS.
3. Upholding Neutrality, Not Obstruction
Indonesia’s bebas-aktif (free and active) foreign policy has long emphasized legal neutrality in foreign conflicts. This is because Indonesia maintains its reputation as a peace-loving country. Far from violating international law, a neutral Indonesia respects the San Remo Manual on International Law Applicable to Armed Conflicts at Sea, especially Rules 23–30, which govern neutral states during armed conflict at sea.
Most notably, Rule 29 of the San Remo Manual states: “Neutral States may not suspend, hamper, or otherwise impede the right of transit passage nor the right of archipelagic sea lanes passage.”
In this regard, Indonesia’s declaration of neutrality would not imply the suspension of rights, but the lawful expectation that belligerents transiting through its ASLs do so without engaging in acts prejudicial to its sovereignty or neutrality. Indonesia, as a neutral state, is required to prevent its territory from being used for hostile operations, but it may not prohibit lawful navigation in accordance with international law.
4. The Strategic Delay Argument is Misleading
Panjeti contends that a six-day delay and $11 million in fuel costs make Indonesia’s position strategically dangerous. Yet, strategic inconvenience is not a valid legal argument to override a state’s sovereign regulatory rights under international law.
UNCLOS provides specific transit rights for warships, but these are conditioned rights. Foreign military vessels must comply with the mode of passage prescribed under UNCLOS: either innocent passage under Articles 17–19 or transit passage under Articles 38–39. These rights do not grant carte blanche access, nor do they allow states to ignore airspace control or security protocols of the archipelagic state.
Indeed, Article 39(1)(c) requires all vessels and aircraft to: “Refrain from any threat or use of force against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of the archipelagic state.”
If the U.S. Navy’s planned route involved high-intensity surveillance, electronic warfare exercises, or pre-conflict readiness maneuvers, Indonesia would have grounds to question whether such activities still constitute lawful passage.
5. ASL Designation and the “Partial Adoption” Misconception
A significant part of Panjeti’s argument hinges on the claim that Indonesia’s designated ASLs are only “partially adopted,” implying a legal gap or non-compliance. However, this misreads UNCLOS language and state practice.
Article 53(1) states: “An archipelagic State may designate sea lanes… normally used for international navigation.”
The term “may” indicates discretion to designate all possible directions in accordance with all relevant legitimate considerations by the archipelagic state. Indonesia’s decision to designate north–south ASLs (I, II, III) through Government Regulation No. 37/2002 and to submit them to the IMO fulfils its obligation to facilitate international transit. The designation of these ASLs is an entirely legitimate decision by Indonesia, given the balance of Indonesia’s and user states’ interests.
Furthermore, if a foreign vessel wishes to navigate outside these designated ASLs in exercising rights under Article 53(12), it may still do so under the right of innocent passage. This right is exercised with the understanding that such transit is subject to stricter behavioral restrictions under UNCLOS Articles 17–19.
6. Dynamic Incidents do not necessarily mean Legal Noncompliance
Panjeti cites several incidents—such as the 2025 C-130 overflights and the 2003 Bawean incident—to imply that Indonesia is overreaching in asserting its maritime domain. However, these are better understood as real-time policy frictions rather than deliberate violations of international law.
Like many states, Indonesia’s interpretation and enforcement of airspace and maritime rules have evolved as its naval capacity has grown and its geostrategic sensitivities have heightened. Frictions over notification requirements, airspace control, or engagement rules are operational, not legal, and similar incidents have occurred in other states.
These should be resolved through diplomatic clarification and confidence-building, not by mislabeling Indonesia’s actions as systemic non-compliance.
7. Navigating Between Law and Strategic Stability
What Panjeti underestimates is Indonesia’s role as a regional stabilizer that actively upholds the rules-based international order. As a country with one of the most extensive maritime jurisdictions, Indonesia has consistently adhered to UNCLOS, both in principle and in practice.
Indonesia has ratified and implemented UNCLOS (Law No. 17/1985), designated ASLs and submitted them to the IMO, refrained from suspending or manipulating sea lane passage during global tensions, and consistently asserted its sovereign rights without impeding lawful navigation.
The notion that Indonesia would abandon this record in a crisis is unsupported by legal precedent or diplomatic practice. If anything, Indonesia’s likely reaction would be to reaffirm its commitment to neutrality, provided all actors respect its sovereign rights.
8. Conclusion: Lawful Neutrality Is Not a Threat
Indonesia, as an archipelagic state and a leader in ASEAN, does not and cannot seek to obstruct international navigation. However, it cannot allow its sovereignty to be diminished under pressure from major powers. What Panjeti portrays as obstruction is, in reality, a calibrated assertion of legal rights and obligations under the UNCLOS framework and customary international law.
Indonesia’s consistent adherence to international maritime law—coupled with its diplomatic engagements and strategic restraint—illustrates its commitment to being a responsible maritime state. The lawful exercise of neutrality, regulatory authority, and sea lane management is not a betrayal of international law, but a fulfilment of it.
In closing, Indonesia will continue to uphold and implement the law of the sea—not only as a coastal and archipelagic state but also as a guardian of international legal order in a turbulent maritime century.
