In a new era of global energy instability the hydrocarbon resources of the South China Sea have become more critical to all its claimants, which include some of the countries hit hardest by supply shocks stemming from the Iran war. While most claimants have been continuing ambitious efforts to access new hydrocarbons in deepwater wells further offshore, the Philippines remains on the sidelines, living under a moratorium on exploration in disputed areas that has lasted over 12 years. But as Manila mulls options for accessing the resources on its continental shelf, the rest of the region is digging in.

This feature details major offshore energy developments for claimants across the South China Sea from 2024 to 2026. Many projects lie in disputed waters, some at the sites of previous confrontations. Though China’s coast guard reduced the time spent patrolling near Southeast Asian oil and gas sites in 2025, maritime tensions stemming from offshore development remain a significant risk.

China

Since AMTI’s last survey of offshore oil and gas, China has made six discoveries in the northern South China Sea, including 100 million tons of oil at Kaiping South in March 2024; 3.5 trillion cubic feet of gas at deepwater field Lingshui 36-1 in August 2024; a deepwater gas discovery at Liwan 4-1 in September 2024; 100 million tons of oil at Huizhou 19-6 in March 2025; another discovery that month at Weizhou 10-5; and a discovery at Enping-11 in the first half of 2026.

China has also brought 19 fields into production in the South China Sea over the past three years, contributing to record production highs of 398.7 million barrels of oil equivalent (BOE) in the first half of 2026 for state-owned industry giant China National Offshore Oil Corporation. This includes 11 fields in the Pearl River Mouth Basin (Liuhua 11-1 and 4-1, Huizhou 26-6 and 25-8, Panyu 11-12, 10-1, and 10-2, Wenchang 19-1, 9-7, and 16-2, and Xijiang 24); five in the Beibu gulf (Wushi 23-5 and 17-2, Weizhou 5-3,11-4, and 10-3); two in the Song Hong/Yinggehai Basin opposite Vietnam (Dongfang 29-1, 1-1 Gas Field 13-3); and one in the Qiongdongnan basin (Shenhai-1).

Vietnam

Vietnam has continued to develop resources both in its near waters and farther offshore in areas that overlap with China’s nine-dash line.

In the past three years, Hanoi has secured several large discoveries that are outside of disputed areas. U.S. firm Murphy Oil and Korean firm SK Earthon struck big in 2025, finding up to 430 million BOE at the Hai Su Vang field in block 15-2/17 as well as discovering oil at Lac Da Hong (Pink Camel) field in block 15-1/05. Another field in 15-1/05, Lac Da Vang (Golden Camel), is also on track to produce its first oil in late 2026. And a major source of offshore energy for Hanoi outside of disputed areas is underway in the Block B mega project in the gulf of Thailand, a cooperative project between Petrovietnam, Japan’s Mitsui Oil Exploration Co., and Thailand’s PTT Exploration and Production (PTTEP) which is aiming to supply 177 billion cubic feet of gas per year as early as 2027.

But Hanoi is also continuing development in more contested areas. In June, Petrovietnam signed production sharing contracts for blocks 10-11 and 10-11/1 in the Nam Con Son basin. And in July, Petrovietnam made a discovery of 242.5 billion cubic feet of gas in nearby block 11-2, which straddles the nine-dash line.

Some foreign operators have also shown they are willing to stick it out in disputed areas. In 2025, UK-based Pharos Energy extended its exploration licenses in blocks 125 and 126, whose edges also cross the nine-dash line, through 2027. Pharos, which also operates production fields Te Giac Trang (block 16-1) and Ca Ngu Vang (block 09-2), is reportedly set to be acquired by Israeli firm Ratio Energy in 2027. Another UK firm, Enquest, will remain invested in Nam Con Son for the long haul, extending its production sharing contract in Block 12W, which is inside the nine-dash line, through 2034.

However, U.S. energy giant ExxonMobil’s flagship investment in Vietnam’s Block 118 “Blue Whale” project remains stalled despite meetings between Hanoi and Exxon executives in 2025. The area is outside the nine-dash line but might fall within a potential Chinese continental shelf from the Paracel Islands.

Amid global energy disruptions, Hanoi has also looked to Moscow, whose state-owned oil company Zarubezhneft continues to play an important role in Southeast Asian offshore energy, including in the Nam Con Son basin. During Vietnamese president To Lam’s state visit to Russia in September, Petrovietnam signed a framework agreement with Zarubezhneft to establish a strategic oil reserve in Vietnam.

Indonesia

Though Indonesia’s claims in disputed areas of the South China Sea are limited only to the southernmost sliver of the nine-dash line, that area harbors large deepwater hydrocarbon reserves that have been the focus of maritime tensions with Beijing in the past. Nevertheless, Indonesia has pushed forward development of the area with high profile support from top leadership, including President Prabowo Subianto.

Prabowo attended an event inaugurating the first production at two fields in South Natuna Block B in 2025. But progress in more disputed areas has been slower: the most developed prospect in the northern reaches of Indonesia’s continental shelf, the Tuna block, hit a snag when UK-based operator Harbour Energy announced in 2025 that it was selling its interest in the project, reportedly because sanctions on Russia had made it difficult to cooperate with its partner in the project, Zarubezhneft. The Russian firm stayed on, however, and resumed development in June 2026.

Other exploration efforts in the area are gearing up. Indonesian state-owned firm Pertamina conducted seismic surveys of East Natuna in March 2025 and is currently contracting rigs for exploration of the block as early as December 2026. Meanwhile, a new exploration block just south of Tuna, Arwana III, was licensed to Indonesia’s Prime Energy in May 2026. And after reports of major players Kuwait Foreign Petroleum Exploration Company and Shell weighing a bid on exploration block Natuna D-Alpha, the contract was ultimately awarded in September to Indonesian firm PT Nations, a subsidiary of the Arsari Group headed by Prabowo’s brother Hashim Djojohadikusumo.

Malaysia

Malaysia has continued with deepwater developments and exploration, with several new areas in disputed waters coming online in the past few years and the most success of any claimant in keeping foreign investors involved, even in waters that clearly fall within China’s nine-dash line claim.

Several prospects off of Sarawak and Sabah have commenced production, including Jerun in SK408, Kasawari in SK316—both named in a 2024 diplomatic letter from Beijing urging Kuala Lumpur to stop its oil and gas exploration—and GKGJE/Gumusut Kakap Phase 4. Development of SK405B, operated by Thailand’s PTTEP, began in spring 2026 with first oil targeted in 2028.

Even more areas are under exploration, many with foreign investors or operators, and all of them within the nine-dash line. Off Sarawak, SK330 and SK510 were licensed in January 2024 for exploration to Malaysian operator Petronas, with Japan’s INPEX and Indonesia’s Pertamina as partners on the latter. Shell won a bid in 2024 for operatorship of block 5E and is currently preparing to conduct wildcat drilling in its long-held license area MLNG. Off Sabah, U.S.-firm ConocoPhillips won operatorship of the Ubah Cluster in December 2024, while London-based Bridge Petroleum signed a production sharing contract for the Permata Cluster in February 2026. And as of October, state firm Petronas is set to conduct appraisal drilling of a discovery in deepwater block 3K using the drillship West Capella—a veteran of previous oil and gas standoffs with China.

And state firm Petronas is currently conducting appraisal drilling of a major 2025 discovery in deepwater block 3K using the drillship West Capella—a veteran of previous oil and gas standoffs with China. Automatic identification system data and satellite imagery showed the West Capella on site since September 29, this time with no sign (yet) of the China Coast Guard.

West Capella and supply vessels conducting appraisal drilling of the Megah discovery in Malaysian deepwater block 3K, October 17, 2026

Other transactions have continued to ensure that Malaysia maintains a healthy mix of investors in its offshore sector. In December 2024, Japan’s INPEX acquired a 42.5 percent interest in Block 2A in northern Luconia. In June 2025, France’s Total Energies acquired a 50 percent operated interest in Petronas’s SK310B and SK313. And in that same month, two Japanese firms bought in to blocks in Sarawak: Idemitsu Kosan Co. acquired 40 percent interests from SK Earthon in SK427 and the Ketapu Cluster while ENEOS extended its contract at SK10 to 2038. In June 2026, the UK’s Enquest secured operatorship and participating interests in Balingian, SK8, and D35. And in July, Japan’s INPEX bought an 85 percent interest in Block 2E.

With the China Coast Guard shifting effort away from Luconia Shoals in recent years, it would seem that Malaysia’s offshore oil and gas should be off to the races. But one new wrinkle has put a hamper on some prospects: an internal feud over offshore resource control between Malaysia’s national government and that of the state of Sarawak which, with its own firm Petros, has contested national giant Petronas’s dominance in court. Observers have pointed to the power struggle and uncertainty over its outcome as contributing to production delays at SK410-B and ConocoPhillips’s withdrawal from the Salam-Patawali deepwater field.

The Philippines

While it has continued to abstain from exploration in disputed areas, the Philippines in January received a lifeline with the discovery of 98 billion cubic feet of gas at a new field near Malampaya in block SC 38, which generates approximately 20 percent of the electricity for the main island of Luzon. On November 5, first gas was achieved by Malampaya Phase 4 connecting the new Malampaya East-1 and Camago-3 wells to the existing platform, with future plans to drill and connect a third well, Bagong Pag-asa. The project is expected to extend the life of SC 38 to 2032.

Despite the discovery of additional resources at Malampaya, the Philippines’ energy outlook remains dire. Amid an ongoing national energy emergency due to the war in Iran, the idea of joint exploration with China has reemerged. Key government officials have taken turns discussing potential joint exploration with China to help secure Philippine energy supplies: in March, Foreign Secretary Ma. Theresa Lazaro said talks might be “forthcoming”;  in August, President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. called joint exploration a “distinct possibility”; and in November, Defense Secretary Gilberto Teodoro Jr. questioned the constitutionality of joint development. The chief offshore asset to be developed, jointly or otherwise, would be Reed Bank, an area estimated to hold 2.6 trillion cubic feet of gas and covered by Philippine block SC 72, though exploration activities remain suspended.