Midway through 2026, Scarborough Shoal remains the focal point of Philippine-China frictions in the South China Sea, with recent tensions stemming from China’s deployment of floating objects at the shoal, including buoys, floating barriers, and most recently, a temporary research structure. But new data on ship movements reveals yet another cause for concern at Scarborough: a massive increase in presence from the China Coast Guard (CCG), the backbone of Beijing’s efforts to exercise control over the shoal.
A Look at the Data
To better assess recent activity at Scarborough Shoal, AMTI analyzed automatic identification system (AIS) data around the shoal from January 1 to June 30, 2026. The data collected focused on documenting the presence of China Coast Guard (CCG), Philippine Coast Guard (PCG), and Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources (BFAR) vessels, as well as instances of interactions between these Chinese and Philippine ships.
The data shows that CCG patrols at Scarborough have significantly increased in 2026, a remarkable feat given that 2025 was already a record year for CCG presence at the shoal. Through the first six months of 2026, CCG patrols at Scarborough amounted to 933 ship-days, nearly as much as 2025’s entire annual total of 1,099 ship-days (which itself had already doubled from 2024’s total of 516 ship-days).
On a monthly basis, CCG patrol volume increased from an average of 90 ship-days per month in the first half of 2025, to 156 per month in 2026, with ship-days peaking at 216 in May.
As has been the case since last year, some CCG operating near Scarborough conducted patrols along, and sometimes over, China’s claimed nine-dash line, positioning themselves to intercept Philippine ships heading toward the shoal. But in comparison to previous periods, the density of patrol coverage near the shoal has markedly increased. Multiple CCG ships were often seen coordinating to maintain a perimeter patrol, covering all approaches to Scarborough in an approximately 30 nautical mile radius. And inside that perimeter, a persistent detachment of 6-8 Chinese maritime militia maintained similar coverage of the area closer to the shoal.
Philippine law enforcement patrols near Scarborough also increased in 2026, though they remained far fewer than those of the CCG. PCG and BFAR vessels averaged 43 ship-days per month in the first half of 2026 compared to 30 ship-days in the same period last year, an increase of 43 percent.
Encounter between CCG 21563 and the BRP Datu Pagbuaya, and four other vessels on May 27, 2026
The frequent patrols have continued to lead to dangerous encounters between Philippine and Chinese ships. Data for the first half of 2026 showed 112 days on which an interaction was observed between CCG and PCG/BFAR ships near Scarborough, averaging out to 19 days per month. And in several instances, including a May 27 encounter between the CCG 21563 and the BRP Datu Pagbuaya, satellite imagery revealed the presence of additional ships not visible on AIS.
Floating Structures and Research Activities
Beijing’s redoubling of its coast guard patrols has occurred alongside other more creative Chinese initiatives at Scarborough.
Since China’s declaration of a nature reserve at Scarborough Shoal last September, Beijing has installed multiple floating structures in and around the shoal. In the latest incident, the Philippines filed a diplomatic protest against China over a 6-by-6-meter floating structure that was found inside the lagoon of the shoal on May 25. This was the first structure of its kind to be seen in the area, which raised alarms in Manila that Beijing was possibly beginning a larger buildout at the shoal. Chinese official sources, including the Chinese embassy in Manila, eventually stated that the platform was a “temporary research facility” collecting data on the ecosystem of the shoal. The deployment of the platform coincided with the end of a research expedition by a Chinese survey vessel, the Xiang Yang Hong 33, which spent several days at Scarborough in late May after conducting operations at multiple reefs in the Spratly Islands in the preceding weeks.
That platform was eventually removed on June 17, but other floating objects recently installed by China remain at the shoal. This includes two buoys installed last October, and several new objects identified by the PCG in May.
Pushing New Boundaries
China’s activities at Scarborough have entered uncharted territory. The level of concerted CCG presence at the shoal in 2026 is beyond any previously observed CCG activity in the South China Sea since AMTI began regular AIS tracking in 2019. And as Beijing doubles down on these familiar tactics, it is also employing new methods to enhance its physical presence and establish new patterns of (nominally) civilian activity at the shoal—all without crossing the traditional red lines of building a permanent structure or conducting land reclamation. As Beijing pushes the boundaries of just how much control it can assert over the shoal, Manila and Washington would do well to keep a close eye on Scarborough.
