Global public awareness of China’s maritime militia has grown dramatically over the past several years. Once a shadowy group who, outside of China, was known only to experts in Chinese maritime and fisheries policy, videos of militia vessels actively supporting the China Coast Guard (CCG) in confrontations with the Philippines have now become a familiar sight to news-watching audiences globally. But while both the militia’s existence and its role in China’s operations in disputed waters are common knowledge, important details about the militia’s size and makeup remain undocumented.
To help address these gaps, AMTI is updating the lists of militia vessels published in its 2021 report, Pulling Back the Curtain on China’s Maritime Militia. That report documented that China operates two distinct militia fleets dedicated to South China Sea operations: those Beijing calls “Maritime Militia Fishing Vessels” (海上民兵渔船, haishang minbing yuchuan) and those it labels “Spratly Backbone Fishing Vessels” (南沙骨干渔船, nansha gugan yuchuan). The former are professionals who operate from Hainan province. The latter are civilians who are heavily subsidized and operate mainly from Guangdong.
Combining automatic identification system (AIS) data with public reporting on militia activities in the South China Sea, these updates will enable more accurate estimates of the militia fleets’ overall sizes and a better understanding of differences in militia activity between vessels from different provinces. This feature, the first in a series, updates the lists of known and suspected militia vessels based in Hainan.
Methodology
AMTI examined historical AIS data (from commercial provider Starboard Maritime Intelligence) from the past four years of over 1,000 fishing vessels with names containing the prefix “Qiong” indicating their homeport in Hainan province. Vessels were flagged as “likely” militia if they had broadcast from at least one of several known areas of militia activity. These areas included major Chinese outposts in the Spratly Islands (Fiery Cross, Mischief, and Subi reefs), unoccupied features known to regularly host idle militia groups (Whitsun Reef, Sabina Shoal), as well as sites of tension with the Philippines where there has been documented militia activity and coordination with CCG (Thitu Island, Second Thomas Shoal, and Scarborough Shoal). Among the vessels that met these criteria and were flagged “likely”, those that displayed consistent activity at several of these locations over time were identified as militia with high confidence.
An example of a vessel identified with high confidence from AIS is the Qiong Sansha Yu 00001, whose track from May 2020 through December 2024 showed repeated deployments to Scarbrough Shoal, Subi Reef, Thitu Island, Mischief Reef, and Second Thomas Shoal.
Findings
AMTI has been able to expand its list of known and suspected Hainan-based militia from 69 in 2021 to 152 today. The full table of vessel names, maritime mobile service identity (MMSI) numbers, and identification level can be viewed at the bottom of this feature.
AMTI has now identified 105 Hainan-based militia with high confidence. These include 27 vessels already confirmed in 2021, 40 vessels that were marked as likely militia in 2021 but whose identity has been confirmed by newer data, and 38 vessels not in the 2021 dataset at all.
The list of likely Hainan-based militia vessels has also expanded to 47. This includes 42 newly identified vessels whose AIS was seen at militia hotspots and 2 vessels that were listed as likely militia in 2021 but had insufficient data to upgrade their status to high confidence. This list also includes 3 vessels which AMTI was unable to find using AIS but which presumably exist given that their hull numbers fall within a series of known militia vessels. For example, AMTI was unable to find AIS records for the Qiong Sansha Yu 00102 but identified Qiong Sansha Yu 00101 and 00103 through 00122, all of which are confirmed as militia. Qiong Sansha Yu 00102 therefore presumably exists and, like its sister ships, is part of the professional militia.
The professional Maritime Militia Fishing Vessels operating in the South China Sea, which are purpose built, usually state-owned, and whose operations are fully funded by the local, provincial, and central governments, all appear to be based out of Hainan province. That does not mean that all militia in Hainan are professional militia, but most likely are. Over half of Hainan-based militia identified by AMTI are registered to Sansha City on Woody Island in the Paracels. As previously documented, this fleet is operated by the state-owned Sansha Fisheries Development Co. Ltd. The AIS data of these vessels displayed the most convincing and consistent level of militia activity, leading every Sansha-registered vessel for which AIS data was available to be identified with high confidence as a member of the militia. This is no surprise, as Sansha city has been the center of the militia’s modernization and professionalization since 2013.
Most of the other vessels identified in this research come from the homeports of the three oldest professional militia fleets in Hainan: those operating from Baimajiang in Danzhou, Tanmen in Qionghai, and Yazhou in Sanya (just a few miles from Yulin Naval Base). Vessels registered to these ports (those labeled Qiong Dan Yu, Qiong Qionghai Yu, and Qiong Sanya Yu) account for 41 of the remaining 68 vessels. Many of these, perhaps even most, are professional militia vessels, but it is difficult to say how many. For instance, AMTI’s earlier research showed that Tanmen houses a professional fleet under the Tanmen Maritime Militia Company alongside a civilian contingent of Spratly Backbone Fishing Vessels.
Most of the vessels not registered to Sansha in this dataset had gaps in their AIS tracks that make it impossible to say for sure whether they spend most of their time at sea on militia activities. Several also displayed indications of what could be genuine fishing activity, spending time in pockets of water in the southern and western South China Sea that are far from any disputed features. So while most Hainan-based militia vessels—and all of those registered to Sansha—are professionals, there are civilians in Hainan who spend only part of their time on militia tasks.
Conclusion
Using data from the last four years, AMTI has been able to expand its 2021 list of known and suspected Hainan-based militia vessels from 69 to 152. Most of these, the 84 registered to Sansha, are operated and funded entirely by the state as what China dubs Professional Maritime Militia Vessels. These are the militia most likely to directly harass foreign government vessels and operate hand in glove with the CCG and People’s Liberation Army-Navy, as seen in recent violence directed toward the Philippines at Second Thomas, Scarborough, and Sabina shoals.
The remaining 68 identified militia boats from Hainan are likely a mix of professionals (especially those from Tanmen, Sanya, and Danzhou) and part-time civilians, including some receiving subsidies under the Spratly Backbone Fishing Vessels program. The Spratly Backbone fleet, most of which come from Guangdong, make up the flotillas that anchor in the Spratly Islands by the dozens or even hundreds for much of the year. They will be the focus of the next update in this series.
Updated List of Hainan’s Maritime Militia
Cover photo: JAM STA ROSA/AFP/Getty Images
