Ports & Power in the Indian Ocean
How naval power, porting agreements, and access will shape the future of the Indian Ocean
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Colombo, Sri Lanka
Today
China has been involved in the construction of an artificial island near the Colombo South Harbor, to be known as Colombo Port City. After President Maithripala Sirisena’s victory in Sri Lanka’s January presidential election, the USD 1.4 billion project faced cancellation and it remains unclear whether or not it is now back on track. China docked a nuclear submarine at Colombo port in September 2014 and a diesel-powered attack submarine in November 2014. Meanwhile, India expressed strong reservations about these dockings at the ministerial level. China extended USD 4.671 billion in assistance to Sri Lanka between 2005 and 2012, replacing Japan as Sri Lanka’s largest overseas donor.
In the Future
Sri Lanka has stated that it will not allow additional Chinese submarines to dock in its ports, citing concerns over relations with India and other nations. If the Colombo Port project resumes, however, the Sri Lankan administration may be more receptive to China than previously indicated. The port project would become part of China’s One Belt One Road and Maritime Silk Road initiatives. Some analysts have suggested that China’s goal is to create a maritime conduit protected by ships and submarines, which would allow the nation to project significant power in the Indo-Pacific region.
Implications
Without a formal basing agreement, port visits by Chinese submarines to Sri Lanka will be sporadic at best. China’s potential extension of its land reclamation expertise in building Colombo Port City speaks to its willingness to use its South China Sea tactics elsewhere, as well as to its interest in courting Indian Ocean maritime nations. With frosty Sino-Indian relations, Sri Lanka may be the largest infrastructure hub in play for China in the region.
Mahe, Seychelles
Today
On December 12, 2011 China announced that it would establish its first military base in the Indian Ocean on Mahe in the Seychelles. The base agreement followed a December 2011 state visit by Chinese Defense Minister Gen Liang Guanglie, and was premised on Chinese assistance in anti-piracy operations. The Chinese Navy has paid sporadic port visits to the Seychelles since 2010. A Chinese Type 052 heavy destroyer was deployed to the Seychelles to participate in their National Day parade in June 2012. Since then, however, few details have been available on China’s plans for the Seychelles. Some experts have cited reports that China aims to establish a “relatively fixed supply base for warship berthing, fixed-wing reconnaissance aircraft and the naval staff ashore rest,” which would be “dual-use” in nature. To date, however, there remain few indications that China has made any substantive progress towards these goals.
In the Future
In January 2013 the International Herald Leader, a subsidiary of the state-run Xinhua newspaper agency, published a commentary that urged the PLA Navy to build overseas naval bases in order to protect energy supply lines from the Middle East. Chinese tourism to the Seychelles has increased, and there is an active Chinese community in the capital city of Victoria.
Implications
The United States has a defense relationship with the Seychelles and deploys surveillance drones from its airport. Officially, the United States has welcomed Chinese anti-piracy deployments to the Seychelles, and confirmed that U.S. and Chinese military activity in the region need not be mutually exclusive. India, who also makes regular naval visits to the Seychelles, is most wary of the deployments.
Male, Maldives
Today
Since 2009, China and India have competed for influence in the Maldives. When China began talks with Maldives’ officials regarding security operations to combat drug smuggling, terrorism, and piracy, India responded by announcing it would establish a naval base and a listening post on the small island nation. As part of the Maritime Silk Road initiative, Chinese President Xi Jinping visited the Maldives in September of 2014, pledging to build a new bridge that would connect the island of Male with the island of Hulhule. Xi also pledged USD 97 million in grant assistance to the Maldives and USD 3.2 million in military cooperation.
In the Future
As China moves forward with its Maritime Silk Road initiatives, it seems likely that it will increase investment and focus on the archipelago. Though China is interested in establishing friendly ports and military bases across the region for resupply purposes, it also has long term ambitions in cultivating a friendly soft-power environment through trade, tourism, and diplomacy. The First Meeting of the China-Maldives Joint Committee on Trade and Economic Cooperation was held in Beijing on December 18, 2014. Chinese investment in Maldives tourism is expected to rise, with 30 percent of the archipelago’s tourism currently flowing from China.
Implications
The Maldives has little interest in pursuing any type of exclusive relationship with China that would block U.S. or Indian access to their facilities and infrastructure. Given its strategic location, the Maldives provide China unique access to facilities in Pakistan and the Gulf of Aden. The Maldives, of course, faces a profound threat from climate change and may be underwater by 2040. As one Indian naval official noted “even if it goes under water … it will be ideal for submarines.”
Gwadar, Pakistan
Today
On April 14, 2015, China won the rights to operate Pakistan’s Gwadar port for a period of 40 years. China is believed to have financed and constructed the port because it allows a land-based transport route for Middle Eastern oil by connecting Gwadar with the Chinese city of Kashgar, over 1800 miles away. Gwadar is strategically situated in Pakistan’s western province of Balochistan near the Strait of Hormuz. The land-based trade route would allow China to bypass many of the politically and strategically sensitive maritime regions that the Maritime Silk Road initiative seeks to secure.
In the Future
Planned improvements to the Gwadar port include an expressway linking the harbor and coastline, an international airport, breakwater, and nine other projects expected to be completed in three to five years. China intends to invest an additional USD1.62 billion into the Gwadar project. For the time being, the port project serves the Pakistan navy’s interests. Some have speculated that China could also build its own port at Gwadar, which would allow it to deploy submarines and naval assets into the Gulf, and to improve its energy security and power projection capabilities.
Implications
Access to a land-based energy supply line that bypasses the South China Sea has obvious benefits for China, which imports 11 percent of its energy. A closer Sino-Pakistani partnership may make India feel more encircled and lead to counterbalancing in the Indian Ocean region.
Chabahar, Iran
Today
In July of 2013, China and India registered competing bids to overhaul the Chabahar port facility in Iran. India bid USD 100 million and China USD 60 million, yet early indications suggested that China might win the contract. By 2015, it was clear that India would get the rights to build Chabahar, while China would gain access to Gwadar.
In the Future
India appears to be betting that a nuclear deal with Iran will end Tehran’s isolation, and that Delhi’s new infrastructure and trade ties with Tehran may prove lucrative. When compared to the Pakistani port of Gwadar, Chabahar is a much less developed and smaller project. Chabahar however, will function as a regional hub and allow access to Iranian markets and those of other Gulf States.
Implications
China and India’s competition over Gwadar and Chabahar may proxy for the two countries’ broader strategies for gaining influence around the Indian Ocean. The wisdom of India’s investment, however, will be determined by Iran’s ability to serve as a major regional market, and therefore by Iran’s broader status on the global stage.
Diego Garcia, British Indian Ocean Territory
Today
Diego Garcia is a small, 17 square mile atoll in the Chagos archipelago of the Indian Ocean. The United Kingdom leased the island during the Cold War and, since the early 1970s, the atoll has been home to a major U.S. military base hosting 3,000-5,000 U.S. and British personnel. 2,000 native Chagossians were relocated from the island by the British government in advance of U.S. occupation. The United States has deployed B-1, B-2, and B-52 bombers from Diego Garcia, as well as numerous naval and embarked forces from the atoll. Diego Garcia was a crucial supporting base in the 1991 Gulf War, as well as the more recent wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. The contract between the United States and Britain allowing access to Diego Garcia is up for renewal in 2016, the 50th anniversary of its signing. It may be delayed or complicated due to allegations that the United States used the atoll for extraordinary rendition during the Iraq and Afghanistan wars.
In the Future
The United States has invested years of construction and development into Diego Garcia and the island has been described as a critical strategic asset. However, controversy continues over the way the United States has used the base, as well as the humanitarian conditions of the native Chagossians’ relocation and the status of their bids since the 1960s calling for return to the atoll. Given the geostrategic importance of the atoll, the money already spent improving it, and the nature of the U.S.-U.K relationship, however, it is likely that the contract will be renewed.
Implications
Diego Garcia’s strategic significance stems from its utility as a base for long-range bombers and a stage for naval assets for ongoing operations in the Middle East, Indian subcontinent, and Southeast Asia. If not for Diego Garcia, the United States would have to examine other basing options in the Indian Ocean, perhaps with other island powers. Analysts have described Diego Garcia as the center point of the U.S. Indian Ocean strategy.
INS Kadamba, Karwar
Today
India’s INS Kadamba base is located near Binaga Bay in Karnataka, India. Built amidst deep bays and hilly terrain, the base was first commissioned in May 2005 under the USD 561.6 million “Project Seabird.” The facility originally included a ship lift facility, harbor, anchorage, berthing facilities, and accommodation facilities. Several major ships are based out of INS Kadamba including the aircraft carrier INS Vikramaditya, which entered service in 2012.
In the Future
INS Kadamba is undergoing the second phase of Project Seabird which will see it transformed in 2017-2018. New additions to the facility include a new naval air station, a naval research institute, a transmission station, a naval weapon yard, and additional berthing facilities for 50 naval vessels. The new naval air station will have a 6,000 ft. runway and discussions are underway to plan an international airport. If all of the Project Seabird upgrades are completed, INS Kadamba will advance from India’s third largest to its largest military port.
Implications
INS Kadamba represents India’s increasing investment in its navy and power projection capabilities in the Indian Ocean. The modernized base will allow India to enhance its intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities via its new air station. India has many military ports along its coastline, but INS Kadamba is its most significant investment to date. The project suggests that while India may be looking and acting East in its foreign policy, its national security policy still largely faces west.
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